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Coherence, Mutual Assurance and the Rationale
for a Treaty
sheldon leader*
My aim here is to explore the links between two leading reasons for having
a binding treaty on business and human rights: the goal of achieving policy
coherence and the goal of achieving mutual assurance between states.
These two objectives can interact with one another, and their interaction
is not usually investigated. Doing so can help shape the design of a treaty in
a more promising direction than it might otherwise take. It will also reveal
how a treaty is a more urgent need than is often acknowledged. The text is
followed by proposed sections in a treaty that reﬂect the argument.
3.1 Policy Coherence as a Goal
As the UN Secretary-General urged in his Report on the post-2015
sustainable development agenda, there is a need to remedy the ‘. . . policy
incoherence between current modes of international governance in mat-
ters of trade, ﬁnance and investment on the one hand, and our norms and
standards for labour, the environment, human rights, equality and sus-
tainability on the other and to ensure investment policies that are in line
with the Guiding Principles.’1 Doug Cassel and Anita Ramasastry, in
their recent excellent portrayal of the potential elements in a treaty, point
to two levels at which this need for policy coherence is felt: national and
international. At the level of national law they remind us that the UN
Guiding Principles ‘. . . call on States to ensure that their laws and
institutions aﬀecting business are coherent with their duty to protect
* I would like to thank the two editors for their project leadership and to contributors to this
volume for their insightful comments which have made a substantial diﬀerence to the
arguments presented in this chapter.
1 UN Secretary General, ‘The Road to Dignity by 2030 – Synthesis Report by the UN
Secretary General on the post 2015 Agenda’ (A/69/700, paras. 95 and 105). http://docu
ments.tips/documents/sg-synthesis-report-road-to-dignity-by-2030.html.
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human rights,’ and this points to the need for coherence between
human rights norms and ‘. . . corporate law and securities regulation,
investment, export credit and insurance, trade and labour as well as
professional codes regulating the legal profession.’2 At the level of
international agreements, Cassel and Ramasastry point to the need
that ‘. . . States . . . maintain adequate domestic policy space to meet
their human rights obligations when pursuing business-related policy
objectives with other States or business enterprises. In this spirit, states
might agree to include human rights protections in future investment and
trade treaties. They could also agree to add human rights standards to the
terms of existing treaties.’3
3.1.1 Two Types of Coherence
All this is well and good, but what are we actually looking for in this call
for more policy coherence? It is a need that carries diﬀerent degrees of
normative force. At a minimum, the call for coherence among diﬀerent
branches of the law focuses on the fact that the demand to respect
human rights might be present in some sets of norms and missing in
others, all within the same legal system. There can be, as in some of the
examples to follow, an obligation on a state to respect human rights in
one instrument, such as a human rights treaty, and an obligation on the
state in another instrument, such as an investment treaty, to do things
that the human rights treaty forbids. Those interpreting the investment
treaty might be able to avoid formal contradiction between legal obliga-
tions here by declaring that the human rights treaty has no relevance to
its construction. A treaty linking business and human rights would take
aim at this exclusion, stipulating that human rights requirements must
explicitly or implicitly form part of the corpus of all legal disciplines
regulating business.
Notice, however, that there are two ways of ﬁlling out this demand.
One approach can aim to secure the presence of the rights in all the right
places, but pragmatically leave the interpretation of any given right open
to vary with context. States parties to the treaty will have come to their
2 D. Cassel and A. Ramasastry White Paper: Options for a Treaty on Business and Human
Rights, Prepared for the American Bar Association, Center for Human Rights, and The
Law Society of England and Wales (May 2015) p. 35 https://business-humanrights.org/
sites/default/ﬁles/documents/whitepaperﬁnal%20ABA%20LS%206%2022%2015.pdf.
3 Ibid.
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support for the instrument with very diﬀerent convictions about the
ground and extent to which economic actors should be held accountable
to society for their activities. Wherever possible, on this approach, solu-
tions to particular cases and problems should be sought by drawing on
the least controversial aspects of the fundamental principles linking
business and human rights.4 It follows that those drafting a future treaty
should be content to leave a great deal unsaid: aiming to provide a broad
framework of principles that generate the least controversy and within
which particular solutions will hopefully emerge in the future. Where
there is a clash between the cost of observing human rights norms and
attending to business gains, on this pragmatic approach, resolution of the
conﬂict might, depending on where the balance of forces lies, see human
rights take second place over operative business interests where the two
compete.5
A stronger conception of coherence is diﬀerent. It aims not only to
place the term ‘human rights’ in all relevant parts of the law, but to
generate a uniﬁed coverage and set of priorities for human rights as they
compete with other principles and interests across the norms shaping
business activity. These features will be explored below, but at this point
it is important to notice a concern that these two approaches to coher-
ence share: a worry about the fragility of consensus around the treaty
project. Whereas the ﬁrst approach, pursuing a milder form of coher-
ence, does so out of a concern to preserve support for the treaty via
doing the least to perturb the other legal principles and convictions
framing business activity – be they in corporate, investment or trade law
– the second approach fears that it is precisely this approach that is a
recipe for long-term decline in the support for, and creative shaping of,
a place for human rights in economic activity. It favours pressing for
principles that may be initially unattractive to one or another party in
ongoing dialogues, but which they can be brought to see are credibly
anchored in human rights principles that apply in areas other than
business activity, and which could be plausibly built upon.
Before looking further at the more ambitious species of coherence, it is
important to back up and set it oﬀ against the milder form.
4 C. Sunstein, ‘Incompletely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law’ 2007 Public Law
and Legal Theory Working Paper No 147, Law School, University of Chicago passim
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=957369.
5 S. Deva, ‘TreatingHuman Rights Lightly?’ inHuman Rights Obligations of Business S. Deva
and D. Bilchitz eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 78 at 100.
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3.1.2 Looking Further Into the Milder Form of Coherence
At its most basic, as already said, the call for coherence takes aim at the
fact that human rights requirements might be present in some areas of
law regulating business activity but absent in others. For example, a state
might ﬁnd itself bound to refrain from applying its changed domestic law
to an infrastructure project, where the change is aimed at improving
labour conditions, because it had previously signed a stabilization clause
in an investment contract by which it promised not to alter applicable law
for the lifetime of the project. At the same time, under the terms of a
human rights treaty the state may be obligated to make and to apply
precisely those legislative changes.6 Those adjudicators interpreting the
stabilization requirement within the four corners of investment law often
ignore these human rights obligations of the state, obliging the latter to
pay possibly large amounts of compensation for changing domestic law
as its human rights obligations require, but which the investment agree-
ment prohibits. As has been often pointed out, the result can be a harsh
burden on poorer states. If a treaty on business and human rights insisted
that interpretations of investment agreements had to ‘take account’ of the
potential impact of those agreements on human rights norms binding on
a state party, this requirement, even in such a weakly formulated form,
could widen the scope of attention of those interpreting investment
instruments. It would be an example of mild coherence. The Canada/
Senegal Investment Agreement provides an example. It states that:
Each Party should encourage enterprises operating within its territory or
subject to its jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate internationally recog-
nized standards of corporate social responsibility in their practices and
internal policies such as statements of principle that have been endorsed
or are supported by the Parties. These principles address issues such as
labour, the environment, human rights, community relations and anti-
corruption. Such enterprises are encouraged to make investments whose
impacts contribute to the resolution of social problems and preserve the
environment.7
In this way, human rights can make their appearance in another domain
of law. The appearance in this instrument is indeed modest, being simply
6 On this clash see S. Leader, ‘Human Rights, Risks, and New Strategies for Global
Investment’ (2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law 657–705.
7 Agreement Between Canada and the Federal Republic of Senegal for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Article 3 www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/ﬁpa-apie/senegal-agreement.aspx?lang=eng.
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an encouragement to business to voluntarily adopt a human rights
standard. Nevertheless, it would no longer be possible for someone
interpreting and applying the terms of investment law in this treaty to
say that a concern for human rights is totally irrelevant to their doing
their job. It then becomes legitimate for a tribunal to invoke this part
of the Senegal/Canada investment agreement in order to deal with a
borderline question of interpretation of the investment contract when,
say, the scope of a stabilization clause is unclear. Human rights are
brought in from the cold and made potentially relevant to an answer: it
is a step towards mild coherence.8
With due adjustments, this requirement could migrate from its loca-
tion in a bilateral investment treaty to a global one – to a treaty on
business and human rights – and it could be a provision spread to
other ﬁelds of law governing relevant commercial activity. Indeed, the
prospect of movement towards this minimal level of coherence might be
opened by the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).
A draft of the investment chapter in the agreement submitted by the EU
contains an article stating that:
The provisions of this section shall not aﬀect the right of the Parties to
regulate within their territories through measures necessary to achieve
legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of public health, safety,
environment or public morals, social or consumer protection or promo-
tion and protection of cultural diversity.9
‘Human rights’ are not explicitly referred to in this draft, unlike the
Senegal/Canada investment agreement, but neither are they clearly
excluded. If a state defends a departure from the relevant terms of the
TTIP Agreement treaty as being justiﬁed for the sake of the ‘social
protection’ it allows the state to favour, one of the benchmarks for such
8 Via a clear statement in the objects clause of an investment agreement, human rights can
move from being simply relevant to investment promotion through to having a stronger
position. This could, if suitably framed and coordinated with the preamble, give the
obligation to respect such rights priority over other goals of the treaty when and if there
is a conﬂict. This would be a step towards what is here termed strong coherence, to be
elaborated on below. See the important discussion of this point in in J. Anthony
VanDuzer, P. Simons and G. Mayeda (2012) ‘Integrating Sustainable Development into
International Investment Agreements: A Guide for Developing Countries’ pages 92–94.
www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/6th_annual_forum_commonwealth_guide.pdf (Last accessed
January 6, 2017).
9 European Commission: Draft Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Article 2
“Investment and regulatory measures/objectives” Tabled and made public on12 November
2015. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf.
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protection could be the criteria provided by the human rights norms
binding on that state. On the other hand, if human rights are not
imported by those charged to interpret the TTIP agreement, such that
they understand a state party not to be entitled to deploy human rights as
part of their social policy objectives, we have a potential failure of
minimal coherence: a gap appears between the presence of human rights
requirements binding on a state from one source, such as a human rights
treaty, and the state’s inability to rely on such rights coming from another
source in a trade and investment agreement.
Even if this egregious gap were closed via interpretation, mild coher-
ence still permits an interpretation of ‘necessity’ in the TTIP formulation
above in a way that allows a state to pursue its policy of social protection
in a way that, from among alternative policy choices reasonably available,
does least to hamper the commercial objectives of the treaty: a priority
which may conform with orthodox interpretations of trade and invest-
ment treaties but, as discussed below, is the opposite of that pursued by
principles in human rights instruments.10
A ﬁnal example of a potential role for mild coherence with human
rights norms takes us from the state to decision-making by the private
commercial company. Here, there can be a clash between a company’s
‘external’ obligation – as an entity – to a local population, and the
company directors’ ‘internal’ obligation – owed to the enterprise to
work for its best interests as a matter of company law. A recent instance
has arisen around the controversial Phulbari open-pit coalmine project
in Bangladesh.11 At least 40,000 people are predicted to be displaced if the
project goes ahead in its present form, with 10,000 due to receive alter-
native land. The rest of that population is directed towards what the
company itself admits is a precarious future in unfamiliar urban envir-
onments with a cash sum that studies have shown is likely to dissipate
quickly.12
10 See on this point S. Leader ‘Human Rights and International Trade’ in P. Macrory, et al.
(eds.) Understanding the World Trade Organization: Perspectives from Law, Economics
and Politics (Springer, 2005) Section 5 (D).
11 International Accountability Project / World Development Movement, Complaint to the
UK National Contact Point under the Speciﬁc Instance Procedure of the OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises concerning GCM Resources (UK)Initial assessment of com-
plaint (2013); Final statement (2013) (www.gov.uk); see also Brief by the Essex Business
and Human Rights Project (On ﬁle with the author).
12 Summary of the Report of the Expert Committee to Evaluate Feasibility Study Report and
Scheme of Development of the Phulbari Coal Project, (2007) p. 7 (On ﬁle with the
author).
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GCM Resources, a UK company developing the project via a subsidi-
ary, was challenged before the OECD’s UK National Contact Point to
withdraw from or reduce the scale of the mine because of its likely
damage to food security, health, shelter and other core rights arising
from the Project.13 GCM replied that to do so would lead its directors to
fail to fulﬁl their ﬁduciary obligation under the UK’s Companies Act,
2006 to ‘promote the success of the company for the beneﬁt of its
members [i.e. shareholders – SL] as a whole’.14 While the statute adds
the requirement that in carrying out this duty to shareholders the direc-
tors are to ‘have regard to the impact of the company’s operations on the
community’,15 there is no mention in the text of human rights violations
as guidelines in assessing those impacts. While the company did not
ignore the human rights objections lodged by the complainants, its
directors felt able to read their obligations under the UK legislation in a
way that did not give them signiﬁcant weight.
The Directors may not have the capacity to surrender the contract. GCM
is a UK Company and consequently its Directors are obliged to comply
with UK law. The UK Companies Act requires that a director of a
company must act in the way that he considers, in good faith, would be
most likely to promote the success of the company for the beneﬁt of its
members as a whole, albeit taking into account a number of factors.16
The UK National Contact Point did not comment on this argument. The
issue remains open for it. Once again, human rights are not mentioned in
the text of the Companies Act. If they are not imported by interpretation,
in the name of coherence, then a gap opens: it is possible that human
rights law would condemn Bangladesh for allowing this damaging and
poorly compensated displacement of such massive numbers of people.
However, on their reading of the relevant UK company law, which the
UK National Contact did not explicitly reject, the directors considered
that they were obligated to the company to accept that damaging dis-
placement as the price to pay for assigning ultimate priority to share-
holder interests.
The arguments advanced in the Phulbari case take us a step further.
Notice that the company was willing to admit the potential relevance of
13 Supra n 13 paras. 52–70, at pp. 13–16.
14 The applicable law for the purpose of an OECD National Contact Point hearing was the
Companies Act, 2006 s. 172.
15 Ibid. s. 172 (d).
16 GCM Resources plc, Point by Point Response to Complaint under the OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises Appendix II, paras. 9–10, at p. 35.
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human rights to the issues, but once these were taken into account it
was argued that the rights still did not have enough strength to displace
the fundamental conviction that when a clash emerges between those
human requirements and the primacy of shareholder interests, the
latter must prevail. In other words, the weight assigned to the rights
placed them in a secondary position as compared with shareholder
rights, which continued to have primacy.17 On the strategy behind the
search for mild coherence, this relegation can make sense. Human
rights make an entrance into business decision-making, but they do
so in a way that does least to upset the core priorities assigned to
shareholder interests in corporate law. This could appeal to a strategy
of preserving consensus among those with very diﬀerent conceptions of
the legitimacy of corporate power: human rights are admitted as rele-
vant, but a version of the weight of those rights is delivered that is
designed to work as smoothly as possible with the pre-existing priorities
found in the UK’s corporate practice. Over time, this is not likely to be
enough for a durable consensus around a treaty, and the reason for this
inadequacy merits a closer look.
3.1.3 Levels of Precision vs Levels of Consensus
In a recent comment on the role of business in meeting the UN’s
Sustainable Development Goals, the Institute for Business and Human
Rights said that:
The Sustainable Development Goals are based largely on the hope that
business really has hitched its wagon to the sustainability locomotive, and
fear that a closer lookmight reveal that it has not. The resulting consensus –
don’t ask, don’t tell – signals a temporary alliance of business enthusiasts
and sceptics.18
This diagnosis signals a wider problem that is fundamental for agendas
linking business and human rights. It can be called the paradox of
precision. On the one hand, we need to bemore precise about the features
of human rights that can guide business behaviour in diﬃcult cases. On
the other hand, there is an attraction in keeping things agreeably general:
17 On the distinction between a primary and collateral role for human rights in economic
regulation, see S. Leader: ‘Collateralism’ in R. Brownsword (ed.) Global Governance and
the Search for Justice (Hart Publishing: 2005), 53–67.
18 Institute for Human Rights and Business, State of Play: Business and the Sustainable
Development Goals (2015), 16.
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the more these features are spelled out in detail, the greater the risk that
this will generate fundamental disagreement among the parties con-
cerned. A provisional consensus risks coming apart as an uneasy business
community on one side faces a restive civil society on the other. Yet, at
the same time, we need to know enough details of the content and weight
of human rights if they are to be eﬀective guides in orienting business
activity as framed in such norms as corporate or investment law. Both
sides want relative precision and both sides also fear it, since they know
that they might disagree over the crucial details precision delivers.
If, in this context, these standards are to be taken seriously the parties
confronting one another need to be able to operate by tracing a line
between a legitimate, if regrettable, impact on a human right and a
violation of that right. Those who want to undertake projects that will
disrupt lives, and those who wish to protect populations from such
disruption, both want to be able to trace such a line. This demands
continually greater precision if human rights are to generate precise
interventions able to complement the law that carries on without such
norms. At the moment, to warn businesses that human rights are at stake
in their operations often opens a door to victims, but does not help them
to go through that door. That is, they are not helped towards achieving a
just legal outcome any more than they would have been were human
rights not to have been mentioned at all. Instead, victims’ advocates
frequently fall back on the classical law of tort, contract, company law
etc. To invoke human rights in such situations is often, once the excite-
ment dies down, to invoke a technically redundant element. A treaty
linking business and human rights can help change this state of aﬀairs. It
can move the parties along from asking whether a human right is at stake
per se in business activity towards asking at what level of strength and
detail the right is to operate.
There is no option to stand still here. All sides need a degree of
precision necessary to decide convincingly on a concrete case in the
light of human rights requirements, and all sides face the prospect of a
destructive impasse as time goes on if they push hard for their own
version of those requirements. There are then two ways to proceed: one
is to hold on to the strategy behind mild coherence and hope that it
delivers the concrete results in particular disputes that all sides in those
disputes will ultimately endorse as legitimate. Another is to opt for strong
coherence. As indicated earlier, the former approach is inclined to aim at
the least displacement of the objectives traditionally underpinning cor-
porate and investment law, while bringing human rights into account. In
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doing this, however, there is, despite appearances, a fundamental shift
of priorities – and a price to be paid for the shift. Whereas human rights
instruments typically allow their guarantees to be overridden by the
need to pursue other competing objectives, including commercial ones,
they do so by adjusting the pursuit of those objectives in a way that does
least damage to the underlying human rights at stake.19 The cases and
principles examined above do the opposite: the version of human rights
protection that is admitted is the one that does the least damage to
commercial objectives. Over time, victims confronting this result will
see that human rights receive less weight than they do in other domains
where they are a central, rather than collateral, part of the agenda. A
two-speed result threatens: one giving a stronger role to human rights
concerns outside of the regulation of business activity, and the other
inside it.
It should be possible to avoid this result by assigning the same weight
to a human right across all domains framing business activity: to pursue,
that is, strong coherence.
3.1.4 Towards Strong Coherence
As indicated earlier, this form of coherence looks to fashion a consistent
series of principles capable of reshaping crucial parts of the body of
norms, and not just adding another rule to those already present in the
corpus.20 For this to happen, it is not enough to make sure that the
expression ‘respect human rights’ appears in all the relevant sets of laws
governing business activity. The basic principles informing those norms
must be ranked and given eﬀect in a consistent way in the light of human
rights requirements. This can require re-working certain priorities at the
heart of commercial practice. In turn, this shift in priorities can call for
re-shaping some of the basic elements in corporate, investment and
related areas of the law. This can aﬀect rules such as those deﬁning the
company director’s ﬁduciary duty to the company, or the separation of
parent and subsidiary corporate liability.
19 S. Leader, ‘Collateralism’ supra. n. 19 at 55 and S. Leader, ‘Two Ways of Linking
Economic Activity to Human Rights’ (2005) 185 International Social Science Journal
541 ﬀ.
20 It is a form of consistency central to the work of Ronald Dworkin. See, for example his
notion of law’s integrity in Law’s Empire (Fontana, 1986) chs 6 and 7.
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3.1.4.1 Strong Coherence and the Fiduciary Obligations
of Company Directors
What is at stake can be seen in two examples. The ﬁrst takes us back to the
Phulbari coal mine in Bangladesh. Here, to recall, the directors of the
mining company GCM were seeing their obligations to the population
around the mine through the prism of an overall ﬁduciary obligation to
maximize shareholder value. Even when acknowledging the Companies
Act’s requirement that they ‘have regard’ for the impact of the mine on
local communities, they shaped the scope of that duty through what they
took to be the requirement in the Act that any such attention to social
impacts must be given in a way that does least damage to corporate revenue.
For this reason, they dismissed the call for a reduced initial size of the mine,
which would have required it to be developed in phases: a measure that
would have given local populations more of an opportunity to adjust. That
option, the company argued, would go against investor interests, as it would
reduce annual revenue even though it would still leave the project proﬁt-
able.21 Even if human rights were admitted in this reasoning, such that they
form part of the ﬁduciary concerns for the well-being of the company
as required by UK legislation, that insertion would still allocate those rights
to a collateral role. That is, the company could have acknowledged that it has
to attend to the rights of the aﬀected population, but it could still insist that
a way of respecting those rights had to be found that did least damage to
investor returns. The basic priorities in the objectives of corporate law
remain intact, with a secondary position assigned to human rights.22
A strategy of strong coherence, using as a benchmark the principles
underpinning human rights instruments, inverts this order of priorities.
While acknowledging that such rights may have to be compromised in
order to meet competing commercial demands, it insists that a way has to
be found of meeting those demands, among reasonably available alter-
natives, that does least damage to the rights, not the other way around.23
For instance, staying with the example of internal displacement balanced
against the economic gains produced by projects such as the Phulbari
coal mine, the Oﬃce of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights has said that
21 Supra n.15.
22 See elaborations of this point under ‘directions of adjustment’ between rights in; ‘Three Faces
of Justice and theManagement of Change’ January 2000 63Modern Law Review 55–83; ‘The
Place of Labour Rights in Foreign Direct Investment’ in Global Labor and Employment Law
A. Morris and S. Estreicher (eds.) (Kluwer, 2010), 579–596.
23 Supra n. 21.
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States must give priority to exploring strategies that minimize displace-
ment. Comprehensive and holistic impact assessments should be carried
out prior to the initiation of any project that could result in development-
based eviction and displacement, with a view to securing fully the human
rights of all potentially aﬀected persons, groups and communities, includ-
ing their protection against forced evictions.24
The World Commission on Dams looks more closely at the balance
between human rights and commercial return. It has formulated guiding
principles that can be applied to displacements from land arising from a
wide range of activity. It demands that reasons be given explaining ‘. . .why
the quantity of land proposed to be acquired is necessary and justiﬁed in
relation to the purpose of the project.’25 The ‘necessity’ of a given use of
land must, in the view of the Commission, be set against the requirement
that it pursues the least displacing of the alternative project strategies
available. This can call for compromise, since the Commission presses
for accepting a smaller scale for some projects in return for signiﬁcant
gains to those aﬀected in the local population: which is precisely the
approach that the mining company rejected in Phulbari. In relation to
dams, for example, the Commission argues that ‘. . . small reductions in
height of a large dam may dramatically reduce displacement, with a
proportionately much smaller fall in beneﬁts.’26
The UN Global Compact draws such a line. In its advice about operatio-
nalising higher human rights standards, it anticipates that meeting greater
demands of this sort can result in signiﬁcant extra costs to business. It then
recommends ﬁxing ‘. . . a threshold of losses incurred by an investor, above
which the host state will share the economic burden of compliance’, while
below that threshold the extra costs would be for the investor to bear.27
24 UN OHCHR, ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development Based Evictions and
Displacement’ Annex 1 of the report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing A/HRC/
4/18 Para 3 www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Housing/Guidelines_en.pdf (Last accessed 7
January 2017).
25 World Commission on Dams, ‘Dams, Displacement, Policy and Law in India’ http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINVRES/214578-1112885441548/20480074/
DamsDisplacementPolicyandLawinIndiasoc213.pdf (Last accessed 7 January 2017).
26 Ibid.
27 This is in the analogous context of higher costs resulting from limiting the eﬀect of stabiliza-
tion clauses in order to allow host states to respect ongoing human rights standards. UN
Global Compact, ‘Human Rights and Business Dilemmas Forum, “Stabilisation Clauses”,
Suggestions for Responsible Business,’ para 27 available at http://human-rights.unglobalcom
pact.org/dilemmas/stabilisation-clauses/#.Umf6e5ReuXR (Last accessed on 7 January 2017).
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Via this path, human rights standards can penetrate quite far into a
company’s calculation of costs and beneﬁts. In these statements, special
weight is assigned to human rights considerations leading to a call for
compromise on the company’s search for optimal returns. This could in
turn have a strong impact on orthodox understandings in corporate law
of directors’ ﬁduciary duty to their company, mentioned earlier.28 It is an
impact that goes further than the strategy of mild coherence is likely to
ﬁnd comfortable.
At the moment, the positions advanced by the company in the
Phulbari case, including those it takes which are open to human rights
concerns, express what can be called a two-world view: one set of internal
standards links the director and the company, and another quite diﬀerent
set of external standards links the company, as an entity, and the state.
Internally, the directors are – they argue – bound as ﬁduciaries to treat
human rights concerns as exceptional and secondary factors: taking them
away from their core obligations towards investors. Their allegiance to
the short and long-term interests of shareholders leads them to reject the
call for scaling down the initial size of the mine, followed by a later phase
when the ﬁrst is completed. Whatever concessions are made by the
company to the need to take other measures to respect the human rights
of those aﬀected, such as prior consultation with those aﬀected, this
measure of size reduction could considerably alleviate the inroad on
their basic rights. It is rejected by the company even though no evidence
was submitted that it would signiﬁcantly damage overall proﬁt. Externally,
the picture is quite diﬀerent. The human rights obligations of Bangladesh
point in the opposite direction. Its primary duty is to protect its population
by requiring the company to look for alternative measures that would have
a less damaging impact on human rights. Proﬁtability would have to be
adjusted so as to make this possible. The state would then require the
company, as an entity, to do what the directors do not consider themselves
internally entitled to do under corporate law principles. If the orthodox
conception of the director’s duty to the company remains in place, while
28 See the analysis of the director’s ﬁduciary duty in this context in D. Bilchitz and L.
Ausserladscheider Jonas, ‘Proportionality, Fundamental Rights and the Duties of
Directors’ 2016 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1–27; for a diﬀerently framed argument
see S. Leader, ‘Participation and Property Rights’ (1999) 21 Journal of Business Ethics 97–
109; ‘Gouvernement d’entreprise et droits des salariés’ in S. Leader and P. Lokiec, Pascal,
Revue de droit du travail, (Paris: Dalloz, 2008), 3, 201–203 ; S. Leader ‘Labour Rights in the
World Economy’ In L. Blecher et al. (eds.), Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights
Impacts (Washington DC: American Bar Association, 2013).
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the company as an entity is also called on to respect human rights, a clash
of obligations emerges. Company directors can claim that their ﬁduciary
obligations to shareholders dominate, with the risk – as in Phulbari – that
this is thought to prevent their steering the company towards the same
degree of respect for human rights that the state must display.
A treaty linking business and human rights can close this gap, as will be
argued in Part II. It can provide that the same standards govern the state’s
duty to protect its population’s rights from damage by private actors, the
company’s duty as an entity, and the directors’ own duty to act in the best
interest of that company. The benchmark provided by the state’s obligation
would be carried through into the directors’ ﬁduciary duty to promote the
success of their company. All sets of norms would be integrated, with the
priority assigned to human rights when balanced against other competing
interests. It would be a step towards strong coherence across the collection
of norms regulating business activity.
3.1.4.2 Strong Coherence and Corporate Structure:
The Example of the Corporate Veil
A second example of the potential in strong coherence moves from
deliberations in the boardroom to the place of that boardroom and the
company itself within a wider corporate structure. Here, there is another
potential threat to human rights that a treaty could address. It emerges
in the ever-present problem of the ‘corporate veil’. This element of
corporate law continues to bedevil the search for a way of making
responsibility follow the locus of corporate power. Parent companies
are, barring exceptional circumstances and jurisdictions, often treated
as legally separate entities from their subsidiaries. Liabilities are usually
conﬁned to the subsidiary that caused an accident or signed a commercial
contract, while the parent has no more obligation arising from what its
subsidiary has done than does any other shareholder in a limited liability
company.
At the same time, de facto control over key policies and practices of the
subsidiary is usually in the hands of the parent, sometimes accompanied by
regular transfers of assets from the subsidiary to head oﬃce. If, in this
situation, we simply declare that corporations are to ‘respect human
rights’, we don’t have enough in hand to knowwhen this classic separation
between the liability of parent and subsidiary does and does not contribute
to violations of those rights. Invoking human rights concerns takes us no
closer to seeing when it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil, or
indeed when it is appropriate to side-step the veil without piercing it by
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increasing the range of a parent company’s responsibility for its subsidiary’s
behaviour via an extension of the parent’s duty of care.29 Matters are not
greatly improved if we add provisions which mention human rights like
those in the Canada/Senegal Investment Agreement, seen above. These tells
us that enterprises are encouraged in the name, inter alia, of human rights
to ‘. . . make investments whose impacts contribute to the resolution of
social problems and preserve the environment.’30 A good deal more preci-
sion is needed if this element of the treaty can be turned to helping answer
hard questions about what is and is not to be tolerated in the preservation of
parent companies from liability.31
It is possible for a treaty linking business and human rights to say
more, and with a level of detail that gives human rights real purchase
in dealing with potential abuses of the ‘corporate veil’. Consider the
agreement among member states of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS). The Community has produced a measure
that can be seen as a regional and sectorial species of treaty on business
and human rights.32 The measure, in the form of a directive, provides as
part of its formal commitment to human rights that member states are to
require of mining companies that they obtain free, prior and informed
consent of local communities before exploration begins and prior to each
subsequent phase of mining and post-mining operations. Companies are
to maintain consultations and negotiations on important decisions
aﬀecting local communities throughout the mining cycle. The compa-
nies must also set up socio-economic development funds to which
mining rights-holders shall contribute by law for the development of
new capacity in the aﬀected local communities.33
This is a step towards giving priority to human rights concerns that
strong coherence demands. As the ECOWAS Directive puts the
requirement, ‘. . . Member States, holders of mining rights and other
mining related business entities have a primary34 obligation ·to respect
29 Cf. Chandler v Cape Industries EWCA Civ 525 (25 April 2012).
30 Agreement Between Canada and the Federal Republic of Senegal for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Article 3 www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/ﬁpa-apie/senegal-agreement.aspx?lang=eng.
31 For a strong example of a human rights requirement of greater scope and depth, see Van
Duyser, Simons and Meyeda, supra n. 12 pp. 309–316.
32 ECOWAS Directive C/DIR.3/05/09 on the Harmonization of Guiding Principles and
Policies in the Mining Sector, Article 16. See also discussion of the ECOWAS Directive in
Mining andHuman Rights in Senegal, Amnesty International 2014 www.amnesty.nl/sites/
default/ﬁles/public/p4350_senegal_mining_report_-_web_en.pdf.
33 Ibid., Article 16 para 7. 34 Emphasis mine, SL.
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and promote recognized human rights including the rights of women,
children and workers arising from mining activities.’35 Without want-
ing to read too much into a single word, this claim of primacy for
human rights does give a central rather than a collateral place to human
rights on the business agenda.
It is also precise and concrete enough in its requirements that member
states are given the guidance about elements of corporate behaviour that
must be targeted. The states can in turn re-shape – if necessary by further
agreement among themselves – rules in their corporate law necessary
to give eﬀect to this primacy of human rights-driven requirements about
appropriate levels of consultation and about the establishment of capacity-
development funds for the locals aﬀected. In particular, the member states
have a basis for turning back to their own corporate laws and amending
them so as to hold parent companies liable for claims by victims against
subsidiaries arising from violation of these consultation and development
fund requirements. In these and allied areas picked out by human rights
instruments and principles, the liability could be extended to those compa-
nies within the corporate groupwhich have the resources and/or the relevant
control to compensate adequately or to prevent damage.36 This would not be
a total collapse of the separation between parent and subsidiary liability but
would instead be an intervention that was precisely targeted, integrating
human rights requirements into a principle at the heart of corporate law. It
would pursue a strong form of coherence.
If the strong version of coherence sought in these examples is a
desirable objective what role might a treaty play in achieving it? This is
the next question to consider.
3.2 Strong Coherence via a Treaty on Business
and Human Rights
The prospects for a treaty depend on who is sitting around the table and
on what it is that motivates them to negotiate a treaty in the ﬁrst place.
Consider a classic and important reason for entering into a treaty: the
creation of mutual assurance among the parties to the agreement. If states
agree on a common set of human rights standards guiding business, such
35 Ibid., Article 15 para 1.
36 For an application of this approach to the liability of the Royal Dutch Shell group, see
Corporate Liability In a New Setting: Shell and the Changing Legal Landscape for the
Multinational Oil Industry in the Niger Delta, by the Essex Business and Human Rights
Project (2012), pp. 5155. http://www.essex.ac.uk/ebhr/activities/default.aspx.
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as those in the UN Guiding Principles, then it makes sense that, once
agreed, these standards cease being sites of competition among those
states – even as they carry on competing in other ways – on pain of
triggering a well-known problem known as the ‘race to the bottom’. For,
what starts as being a shared view about the desirability of a certain level
of human rights protection aﬀorded by business can end up being
undermined – not because each state has changed its basic priorities
and come to think it fundamentally right to lower that protection, but
because without agreed sanctions to enforce the shared view, it is
frightened that a competitor will draw inward investment away from
it if it does not weaken that commitment. All the concerned states end
up worse oﬀ – as measured by their own standards – because they
cannot trust one another to hold to the standard that they each initially
subscribed to: the race to the bottom is on.37
3.2.1 Host State and Home State Concerns
While this is a well-known problem, it actually comes in several varieties:
each with diﬀerent potential impacts on the design of a treaty and each
having a particular impact on the goal of strong policy coherence. The
diﬀerence is located in the concerns of states that are primarily hosts to
inward investment on the one hand and, on the other, those that are
primarily home to the companies making such investment. While each
might seek competitive assurance against a race to the bottom, they are
looking at diﬀerent threats and at diﬀerent parties doing the threatening.
For example, the states in ECOWAS have been concerned that interna-
tional mining companies might play one member state oﬀ another in
choosing the regulatory environment in which the companies ﬁnd it
easiest to work. Having made their initial commitment to protecting
human rights at a level of signiﬁcant detail in the mining industry, the
member states are, via this directive, coordinating their eﬀorts via a regional
and sector-focused version of a treaty on business and human rights. As one
analyst puts it, a key objective of this Directive is ‘lessening competition . . .
between the member states’.38 In other words, it aims to remove mutually
undermining competition among ECOWAS members over requirements
37 For an exploration of this phenomenon see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action:
Pubic Goods and the Theory of Groups (Revised edn. Harvard University Press, 1971);
Sheldon Leader, Freedom of Association (Yale University Press, 1992), ch. 7.
38 Mayer Brown Recent Legal Developments in the Mining Sector of West African States page
2 www.mayerbrown.com/ﬁles/Publication/.
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they impose on business: all the ECOWAS member states wish to impose
these requirements, but each member might be tempted to weaken its
commitment to doing so out of fear of what its neighbour might do.
While states that are hosts to international mining activity, often in
the developing world, share this interest, other states – no less involved
in international mining, but as home states in the developed world – share
a diﬀerent interest. Canada and Senegal, for example, do not risk compet-
ing with one another for inward investment – not, that is, in the same way
that Senegal and Mali might compete. Canada may indeed welcome a
measure of regulatory competition between the latter two states as good for
Canadian mining interests in the region. On the other hand, Canada does
share with, for example, the United States or certain states in the EU an
interest in setting similar controls on the responsibilities of the parent
companies for theirMNCs operating abroad. If one home state jurisdiction
is stricter than is the other then they might ﬁnd that corporate head-
quarters migrate to the less stringent –with the attendant loss of corporate
tax revenue and jobs.39
Of course, the diﬀerences among home and host states are not quite this
stark. Countries normally labelled hosts to the activities of transnational
companies may also be homes to large transnational parent companies,
such as India and Brazil, and many that are homes to outward investment
are also hosts to certain inward investment activities of transnationals.
Thus, Senegal might worry about its domiciled parent companies migrat-
ing to less regulated environments in the same way that Canada does. Yet,
this is unlikely to include the fear that the Senegalese parent will move to
Canada, whatever the formalities of a bilateral investment agreement
allowing for two-way corporate investment might provide.40 Equally,
Canada might fear that Senegal can provide a comparatively low level of
labour rights protection and so draw employment away from Canada’s
shores via the latter’s businesses transferring some of their operations to
the cheaper operating environment. This worry can and does provoke
strong reactions from civil society in developed countries, acting to protect
39 There are factors in any given sector that may well deter capital ﬂight from home
countries, such as favourable insurance services, tax laws and investment services avail-
able to nationals. These would weigh against but do not always eliminate the capital ﬂight
concern. I am grateful to Penelope Simons for this point.
40 Agreement between Canada and the Federal Republic of Senegal for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Article3 www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/ﬁpa-apie/senegal-agreement.aspx?lang=eng (Last accessed 7
January 2017).
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labour, health and environmental standards. These issues prompt a search
for a ﬂoor of mutual guarantees, as seen in the section of the investment
agreement between Canada and Senegal mentioned above.41 However, a
home country in the developed world will nevertheless be concerned that
over the wide range of other potential human rights concerns that apply to
business, the hands of its companies should not be tied unduly when
operating in host countries. Canada might therefore be willing to see a
regulatory race to the bottom between host countries in West Africa, for
example, anxious to attract inward investment while wanting to avoid such
a race between itself and other similarly placed home countries wanting to
encourage outward investment for their companies.
Therefore, there are at least two distinct races to the bottom that
threaten: one manifested in worries shared among home countries
about being undercut as they vie for favourable conditions for their
capital-exporting businesses and the second, in distinct worries, shared
among host countries about being undercut as they vie for the best terms
for their capital-importing activities. It is tempting to deny this by
pointing to the fact that both sets of countries largely accept the human
rights standards applying to business as set out in the UNGPs. Support by
states is overwhelmingly in favour of the Guiding Principles, and this can
seem like an inducement to take human rights oﬀ the table as items of
competition between all states, without dividing them between home and
host states. However, this accord on the Principles may deliver less than it
appears to: within that envelope of agreement there is room for strong
divergence about the scope and weight of a relevant human right when
deployed to deal with a particular type of situation. When countries’
interests are as strongly diﬀering as are those in our examples, consensus
among them risks unravelling if pushed too hard to solve particular
problems. There arises the paradox of precision referred to earlier.
Precision is simultaneously necessary and is an obstacle: it is necessary
if the promise of mutual assurance against being undercut is to have any
eﬃcacy in stopping a race to the bottom, and it is an obstacle since the
level of consensus among states needed to make progress is diﬃcult to
obtain. How, if at all, can a treaty help here?
Both home and host countries might reach agreement on what was
identiﬁed earlier as a mild level of coherence. They might eventually
agree, to go back to an earlier example, that human rights obligations
should be included in the ﬁduciary obligations that directors owe to their
41 Canada – Senegal Investment Agreement, Article 16 supra n. 9.
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companies. However, these countries are likely to disagree strongly over
what the concrete impact of human rights standards should be on the
content of that ﬁduciary obligation. Imagine that ECOWAS members
were to propose, as a provision of a global treaty to which Canada was
asked to agree, that states parties to the treaty impose on companies
within their jurisdiction an obligation corresponding to the detailed
requirements that ECOWAS has enacted for mining companies. This
would include the duty to maintain consultations and negotiations on all
important decisions aﬀecting local communities throughout the mining
cycle.42 Canadamay well resist, preferring to fall back on the precedent of
the more general, voluntary provisions of its Investment Agreement with
Senegal stating, as we have seen it do, that ‘. . . Each Party should
encourage enterprises operating within its territory or subject to its
jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate internationally recognized stan-
dards of corporate social responsibility in their practices and internal
policies . . .’43
This has the ingredients of an impasse between host and home states:
an impasse which leads many to predict an interminable wait before the
key terms of a treaty can be agreed by all concerned. However, the parties
and the issues they face are not standing still. While debates about a
global treaty go on, Senegal, other member states in ECOWAS and many
others in mineral-rich areas face pressures – at times amounting to
violent protests – from local populations evicted by mining activity
from their homes, suﬀering damage to their health and family disinte-
gration. Domestic social and political pressures could lead these states to
insist, in the name of human rights, on detailed matters of consultation
and protection for local populations – equivalent to those that the
agreement to produce the Mining Directive contains. If there were no
such mutual undertaking, these states would have less conﬁdence in
pressing companies investing in their economies to take the more costly
route of spending on measures that can avoid social damage in advance,
as the Directive does. Without the mutual assurance that the Directive is
designed to help deliver, the state is thrown back onto the blunt instru-
ment of suppressing protest as it emerges. That can be all that remains in
its reserve of measures. These states face urgent needs in their local
populations that other states that are home to the major enterprises do
42 They could back up their argument by pointing to the resemblance between their
consultation requirements and those of the IFC in its performance standards. See IFC
Performance Standard 1.
43 Supra n. 23.
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not face. The latter are therefore likely to bemore cautious about entering
into a tight, enforceable human rights requirement. They are thus likely
to resist strong coherence.
In short, the members of ECOWAS, and other host states similarly
situated, have good reason to opt among themselves for strong rather than
weak coherence on human rights standards. They have particular reason
to try to close the gap between broad human rights provisions and their
concrete implications in the realm of business activity. The prospect for
strong coherence is greater if the range covered by a treaty is regional
and/or sectorial rather than if it is global. On the other hand, the pursuit
of a global treaty will correspondingly weaken the attractions of a policy
of strong coherence, forcing us to be content to achieve the milder
version.
Much turns on the choices to be made between these two strategies.
We can either aim at strong coherence or, going in the opposite direction,
human rights will move into a ‘two-speed’ regime mentioned earlier:
having greater strength outside of the world of business than they do
within that world. If we go down the latter path we fuel disillusionment,
together with the slow atrophy of support by some and the increasingly
cynical deployment of the label ‘human rights’ by others.
3.3 Conclusion
This argument supports the construction of a treaty on business and
human rights built on consensus among an initially narrow scope of
parties within a given region and/or sector. It is a consensus that can
gradually spread beyond those borders – particularly once home countries
realize that host countries are making robust treaties among themselves
that carry consequences for the former. The initial beneﬁts of this strategy
should show themselves quickly. The mutual assurance such a treaty can
provide could give those hosts facing similar international commercial
pressures to lower social standards a basis for resisting doing so – as a
group with its members able to count on one another. At the same time, it
is such smaller scale treaties that should be able to encourage host govern-
ments to give the human rights they guarantee their proper content and
weight in the name of coherence with human rights standards developed
in other areas of law and policy – a coherence that is not shrunken due to
these rights being introduced into the unfamiliar terrain of business
activity. Without support from such an instrument, national eﬀorts to
give eﬀect to the UN Guiding Principles are likely to be weakened by the
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persistent fear that one’s competitors are not going to live up to the
standards they profess to embrace. If we are to make further progress
nationally, we need mutual assurance internationally – but on a scale that
allows nations similarly placed in the world economy to move ahead with
greater conﬁdence. Such a treaty ﬁlls an urgent need.
3.4 Draft Treaty Clauses Relating to Elements in the Chapter
The following draft provisions are directed at the goals of strong coher-
ence and mutual assurance that have been discussed.
3.4.1 Preamble (Elements)
Whereas it is essential that a Treaty be able to provide assurance that each
state party undertakes to the others that it will observe the Treaty’s
requirements,
Whereas it is recognised that appropriate sanctions be designed and
deployed for failure to respect the said undertaking,
Whereas it is the object and purpose of this Treaty to govern the
relationship between states, non-state actors in the economy, and natural
persons by applying national and international human rights law, and
Whereas human rights law is to be given priority wherever it is in
conﬂict with other bodies of law governing business activity . . .
3.4.2 General Interpretive Protocol (Elements)
The parties agree that the body of law included in Annex I shall be
interpreted in accordance with the requirements of instruments included
in Annex II together with relevant provisions of customary international
law. [Note: Annex I includes relevant provisions of regulating business
activity, including but not limited to corporate, labour, competition,
intellectual property, data management and investment law. Annex II
includes all elements of national and international human rights law
applicable to the parties].
The object and purpose of the provisions in Annex 1 shall have added
to them the object and purpose of giving eﬀect to the rules and principles
of the provisions in Annex 2. Where the provisions in Annex 1 are in
conﬂict with those of Annex 2, priority is to be given to Annex 2. For the
avoidance of doubt, the parties must ﬁnd a method of implementing the
provisions of Annex 1 that, from among reasonably available alternatives,
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imposes the least burden on and/or provides the greatest opportunity to
further the rights provided in Annex 2.
Any party to this Treaty can bring a complaint to [an Authority]
alleging failure by another party to respect the requirements of the fore-
going paragraphs.
3.4.3 Application to Corporate Laws in Annex 1(Elements)
The Parties agree to incorporate into their laws relating to companies the
following provisions:
Directors must execute their duties in a manner that implements their
company’s obligation to respect and adequately remedy the rights guar-
anteed by the provisions in Annex 2 and in compliance with the priority
for human rights as provided for the General Interpretive Protocol.
The individual’s ﬁduciary duty to the company of which he or she is
director shall include respect for the relevant human rights of all
stakeholders.
For associated companies [Note: a term to be deﬁned so as to capture
the features of a corporate group], liability for damage to the rights
indicated in Annex 2 is to be shared among all associates which are or
have been in a position to contribute signiﬁcantly to compensating
and/or preventing that damage. For the avoidance of doubt, where
such damage to human rights has happened, no associated company
will beneﬁt from limitations on liability for the acts of another asso-
ciated company which would otherwise apply.
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